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arl Marx famously remarked that major historical events occur twice – the “first time as 
tragedy, then as farce.” In Ukraine, sadly, tragedy and farce are inseparable. 
That  is  why  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  read  the  current  wave  of  mass  political  protest, 
triggered by the government’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the European 
Union, as a second Orange Revolution. In 2004, inspired by the hope of joining the EU as 
soon  as  possible,  Ukrainians  poured  into  the  streets  to  take  back  a  stolen  presidential 
election.  Back  then,  the  Union  looked  like  a  fantastic  machine  capable  of  making 
authoritarian states democratic and poor societies rich. 
What has brought Ukrainians into the streets this time is something different – the fear that 
their  country’s  European  prospects  could  be  foreclosed  forever.  They  know  that  their 
country will not join the EU in the next decade, and they know that the EU itself is in crisis. 
But they are determined to insist on their right to a European future. Fear of losing that hope, 
it seems, is at the heart of the EU’s soft power when the prospect of enlargement is fading 
away. 
The real legacy of the Orange Revolution, reflected in the current wave of protests, is that 
people  learned  then  that  political  leaders  cannot  be  trusted,  but  that  tens  of  thousands, 
gathered  on  Kyiv’s  Independence  Square,  can  exercise  effective  veto  power.  The  major 
difference between 2004 and today is that, virtually overnight, Ukraine has lost its privileged 
status of geopolitical ambiguity. 
In the two post-cold war decades, the country has been like an oversized suitcase without 
handles – you can neither take it with you nor leave it at the station. It was assumed that 
Ukraine was divided between a pro-Russian East and a mostly anti-Russian West, and that 
any radical move could lead to the country’s break-up. 
Ukraine’s economy is dependent on both Russia and the EU; its labour migrants go both east 
and west, and its no-nonsense oligarchs keep their eggs in at least two baskets. Politically, 
Ukraine is also a world of its own – corrupt, messy and inefficient, but also much more 
pluralistic and open than Russia or Belarus. So, while it was always difficult to know what 
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Ukrainian leaders wanted, it was easy to predict how far they could go. Unsurprisingly, 
Ukrainian  elites  have  spent  the  last  two  decades  making  promises  and  avoiding 
commitments. 
But all of this has changed, almost overnight. Ukraine is not a “kingdom in the middle” 
anymore. Neither Russia, determined to reintegrate the post-Soviet countries in the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), nor the EU, humiliated by President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
refusal  to  sign  the  association  agreement,  can  live  with  the  status  quo.  The  current  crisis 
demonstrates  that  the  EU  underestimated  the  transformative  power  of  its  European 
Neighbourhood Policy – a reminder of both the strength of the EU’s political appeal and the 
weakness of its diplomacy. 
Ultimately, everybody got Ukraine wrong. European politicians made the Kremlin believe 
that Ukraine was not important enough for the EU; as a result, Russia wanted not only to 
block Ukraine’s turn to the EU, but to bring the country into its own integration project. 
European  leaders  also  overlooked  the  cultural  contempt  that  the  Russian  leadership  has 
started to feel for “the same-sex marriage empire” that the EU has become in their eyes. 
Russia got Ukraine wrong, too. The scale of the protests in Kyiv has taken the Kremlin by 
surprise, because Russia’s elite has never considered civil society an independent player in 
national politics and failed to notice the emergence of a European consensus in Ukrainian 
society. But Putin correctly calculated that now, unlike nine years ago, Yanukovych is ready 
to use force if this is the price he must pay to maintain his hold on power. 
Outsiders need to understand how high the stakes have recently become in the post-Soviet 
space, where two opposing integration projects are doomed to clash. There are only three 
options left for Ukraine: sign the agreement with the EU, as the majority of Ukrainians want; 
join Putin’s EurAsEC, as the endangered political elite prefers; or go bankrupt. 
In his insightful observations on the current crisis in Ukraine, Ivan Krastev writes that the 
country is no longer a “kingdom in the middle”: neither Russia, determined to reintegrate 
the post-Soviet countries in the Eurasian Economic Community, nor the EU, humiliated by 
President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the association agreement, can live with the 
status quo. 